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In the last two decades, neuroscience has profoundly transformed how we understand learning, decision
making, self, and social attachment. Consequently, traditional philosophical questions about mind and mo-
rality have been steered in new directions.Philosophy, in its traditional guise, ad-
dresses questions where experimental
science has not yet nailed down plausible
explanatory theories. Thus, the ancient
Greeks pondered the nature of life, the
sun, and tides, but also how we learn
and make decisions. The history of sci-
ence can be seen as a gradual process
whereby speculative philosophy cedes
intellectual space to increasingly well-
grounded experimental disciplines—first
astronomy, but followed by physics,
chemistry, geology, biology, archaeology,
and more recently, ethology, psychology,
and neuroscience. Science now encom-
passes plausible theories in many do-
mains, including large-scale theories
about the cosmos, life, matter, and en-
ergy. The mind’s turn has now come.
The classical ‘‘mind’’ questions center
on free will, the self, consciousness, how
thoughts can have meaning and ‘‘about-
ness,’’ and how we learn and use knowl-
edge. All these matters interlace with
questions about morality: where values
come from, the roles of reason and emo-
tion in choice, and the wherefore of re-
sponsibility and punishment.
The vintage mind/body problem is a leg-
acyofDescartes: if themind isacompletely
nonphysical substance, as he thought,
how can it interact causally with the physi-
cal brain? Since the weight of evidence in-
dicates that mental processes actually are
processes of the brain, Descartes’ prob-
lem has disappeared. The classical mind/
body problem has been replaced with
a range of questions: what brain mecha-
nisms explain learning, decision making,
self-deception, and so on. The replace-
ment for ‘‘the mind-body problem’’ is not
a single problem; it is the vast research
program of cognitive neuroscience.
The dominant methodology of philoso-
phy of mind and morals in the twentiethcentury was conceptual analysis. Pilloried
by philosophers of science as know-noth-
ing philosophy, conceptual analysis starts
with what introspection reveals about the
allegedly unassailable truths of folk psy-
chology. Then, via reflection and maybe
a thought experiment, you figure out
what must be true about the mind.
A frankly a priori strategy, conceptual
analysis ran up against a torrent of neuro-
psychological results that clashed with
the ‘‘truths’’ of folk intuition. Among the
surprises were patients with split brains
or blindsight or hemineglect or alien
hand. Their deficits and residual capac-
ities confounded the designated ‘‘con-
ceptual truths.’’ Because the data are
the data, in place of these alleged ‘‘truths’’
arose empirical questions about brain
mechanisms.
In a general way, therefore, the impact
of neuroscience and psychology has
been profound. Like the world, the mind
turns out to be rather different from how
it appears to us to be. The Earth seems
flat, the moon seems about the size of
a small barn, and boils seem to be
God’s punishment for sin. Intuitions not-
withstanding, it is not so. Like folk physics
and folk biology, folk psychology em-
bodies much misdirection, despite being
moderately serviceable in day-to-day
business. Though introspection is useful,
the brain is not rigged to directly know
much about itself, such as why we are de-
pressed or in love or that factors such as
serotonin levels influence our decisions.
Once philosophers appreciated that the
seemingly invulnerable truths of intuition
were all too vulnerable, conceptual analy-
sis as a method stumbled to its knees.
Currently, the most productive philoso-
phers of the mind/brain are steeped in
the relevant empirical sciences. Predict-
ably, the style of their work varies: exper-Neuron 60,imental, synthetic or integrative, theoreti-
cal or speculative.
Despite advances from the behavioral
and brain sciences, moral philosophers
in general continued to reassure students
that philosophical inquiry into values and
moral rules has essentially nothing to
learn from brain research. Moral philoso-
phy, at least, is safe from neuroscience.
This too, is an illusion. Over the last sev-
eral decades, research on social behavior
has ushered in a naturalistic framework
for looking at human morality and deci-
sion making. My aim here is to tell the
story, about as condensed as the one-
minute Hamlet, of the impact of neurosci-
ence on our understanding of morality.
The story is told against the immensely
rich backdrop of results in the biological
and social sciences. It begins with the
now-legendary research on the neurobiol-
ogy of mate attachment in voles (Insel and
Fernald, 2004; Carter et al., 2008).
Pair-bonding varies across different
species of vole: prairie voles mate for
life; montane voles display no partner
preference. Male prairie voles guard the
female and the nest and share parenting
of the pups. In montane voles, only fe-
males rear the pups. General levels of so-
ciability are also distinct. Placed randomly
in a large room, prairie voles tend to clus-
ter in fairly chummy proximity; montane
voles are loners. What is the brain basis
for these striking differences in sociality?
The main neurobiological contrast is
that prairie voles have a much higher den-
sity of receptors for the sibling neuropep-
tides arginine vasopressin (AVP) and oxy-
tocin (OT) in the ventral pallidum and the
nucleus accumbens, respectively, than
do montane voles (Lim et al., 2004). Al-
though all mammals have both OT and
AVP centrally, it is the receptor density in
these specific and highly interconnectedNovember 6, 2008 ª2008 Elsevier Inc. 409
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in behavior.
The profile of receptor density seen in
prairie voles extends to other monoga-
mous species—for example, to marmo-
sets and the mouse (Peromyscus califor-
nicus). By contrast, nonmonogamous
species, such as rhesus monkey and the
mouse Peromyscus leucopus, have an
OT and AVP receptor profile similar to
that of the nonmonogamous voles. The
data for humans are not yet available.
OT is released during positive social in-
teractions and has been shown to inhibit
defensive behaviors, such as fighting,
fleeing, and freezing. It interacts with the
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis to in-
hibit activity in the amygdala and to down-
regulate autonomic responses originating
in the brainstem. But its effects are con-
text sensitive. OT administered to male
rats increases aggression to an intruder
but decreases aggression toward pups.
Less is known about the role of AVP.
Philosophically, these results were
alarming. Monogamy seemed to be a
complex life choice, requiring rational ad-
herence to a universal rule and conscious
self-control. It was commonly argued that
one had a moral duty to be monogamous
and that this duty is owed to moral delib-
eration and reason or perhaps to God’s
commands. The very possibility that
pair-bonding in humans might be signifi-
cantly underpinned, or even modestly af-
fected, by the density of receptors for
the simple peptides OT and AVP in
brain-specific regions seemed difficult to
square with the high-minded require-
ments of moral duty.
The celebrated caution to acknowledge
here is that human sociality is not identical
to that of voles or marmosets. Quite so, but
like them, most humans do form long-term
attachments with mates, offspring, kin,
and others, and like them, our reward sys-
tems mediate learning local practices.
Moreover, evolution is remarkably conser-
vative; brain organization and chemistry is
shared across mammals. Consequently, it
would not be surprising to find that OT and
AVP play a significantly similar role in so-
cial attachment in humans. Although
much remains to be discovered, available
data point in that direction.
A recent Swedish study indicated sig-
nificant pair-bonding differences between
adult human males who carried the so-410 Neuron 60, November 6, 2008 ª2008 Elcalled ‘‘polygamous’’ variant of the gene
for the AVP receptor and those who did
not (Walum et al., 2008). Manipulations
of OT have also produced significant re-
sults. Using a nasal spray, Kosfeld et al.
(2005) administered OT to human sub-
jects before they began playing Investor,
a neuroeconomics game where the de-
gree of trust between the investor and
the trustee affects the level of monetary
winnings. OT investors showed higher
levels of trust than controls.
Studies on prairie voles and on humans
have shown that OT is important in devel-
opment of normal social behavior, includ-
ing thecapacity for later formationof stable
bonds with mates and others. Wismer
Fries et al. (2005) showed that children
raised in orphanages and deprived of nor-
mal cuddling as infants had significantly
lower levels of OT following interactions
with their adoptive mothers than did con-
trol children interacting with their mothers.
A diminished capacity to form and
maintain trusting bonds with others fore-
stalls the many benefits of cooperation.
King-Casas et al. (2008) studied subjects
identified as having borderline personality
disorder (BPD) as they played the investor
game. In the investor role, BPD subjects
were poor in maintaining a trusting rela-
tionship and poor in signaling trustworthi-
ness to repair a trust rupture, even when
given an incentive to do so. As investors,
they do less well in the game, and they
also self-report lower levels of trust than
do normal controls.
Although these sociality data need to
be widely known because they bear
upon how humans choose, they do not
automatically imply that our standards
for responsibility must be relaxed. An ex-
planation does not entail an excuse,
though it is relevant to our understanding
of behavior (Churchland, 2006).
But so what, the moral philosopher may
ask. What does social attachment have to
do with morality? The hypothesis on offer
is that attachment, and its cohort, trust,
are the anchors of morality; the reward
systems tune up behavioral responses.
Social animals, including humans, have
a powerful urge to be with those to
whom they have become attached. We
feel safe in their company and anxious
when separated.
These emotions spur the brain to find
harmonious solutions to the complexitiessevier Inc.of social life. Attachments per se do not
specify exactly what action should be per-
formed in what condition. They may be
best conceived as dispositions that con-
tour social-problem space. Relative to
context, these dispositions might be ex-
pressed by grooming a consort, attacking
intruders, or nurturing a baby. Come the
time when action is required, a range of
factors can come into play: perceptions,
other emotions such as fear of nearby
predators, drives such as hunger, and
levels of hormones.
The brain’s networks continuously face
constraint satisfaction problems, both so-
cial and otherwise. In dilemmas, some
considerations are not mutually satisfi-
able; e.g., saving one child versus saving
another. Typically, constraints are not
measurable against each other; e.g., how
do we measure the value of training sol-
diers to kill against the cost to them of be-
coming killers? To a first approximation,
the constraints will include immediate de-
sires, but also the force of habits, reputa-
tions, the expectations of others, and eval-
uation of relevant options. As the relevant
constraints weigh in, the networks settle
into a solution—the brain’s decision. The
exact nature of the process whereby net-
works settle is a largely unsolved problem
in computational neuroscience. But the
representation of rules and their applica-
bility to the situation at hand seems to
be only one constraint among others. Ac-
cording to my hypothesis, practical rea-
soning mainly consists in finding a good
solution to a constraint satisfaction prob-
lem. Deduction—the sentimental favorite
of logicians—plays at most a minor or
post hoc role (Churchland, 2008).
Despite the neuroendocrine and wiring
similarities between humans and other so-
cial animals, it may be argued that only
humans have genuine morality. One rea-
son given is that human morality extends
to all humans, in a way in which chimp
morality does not extend to all chimps.
Whether human morality is really as uni-
versal or as exalted as this argument
presumes is controversial, owing to the
history of tribal and national warfare and
common out-group hostility (Wrangham
and Peterson, 1996). It is worth noting
that the idea that human rights apply
equally to all humans, though laudable
by our standards, appears to be a fairly
recent invention (Hunt, 2007).
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it is true that human groups can be large
and that kindly behavior may extend be-
yond the circle of kin and even beyond
the community. Traditional moral philoso-
phers are apt to attribute this phenome-
non to a unique relationship with God, to
the greater intrinsic goodness of humans,
to our greater intelligence, or to some
combination of these. Though these may
be implicated, it is worth considering
that biologically rooted dispositions ex-
plain extending social attachment beyond
kin and clan.
Bowles (2006) has argued that altruism
and lethal competition between human
groups coevolved. Just as a chimp troop
is apt to expand its territory and resources
by killing off members of a neighboring
troop, early hominins probably found it
paid to raid weaker hominin clans and di-
vide the spoils in a sufficiently fair-ish way
to ensure loyalty. Able manpower to de-
fend and attack would be an important
consideration in enlarging the group and
extending attachments.
Even so, amalgamation is a risky busi-
ness, since problematic newcomers could
undermine the welfare or stability of the
group. Will they be a social boon or bur-
den? Before accepting a newcomer, the
group needs assurance that he can bond
normally and is not socially or emotionally
handicapped. The hypothesis is that, as
a first-pass filter for trustworthiness,
unconscious mimicry serves rather well.
Psychological studies on unconscious
mimicry in humans show that the posture,
mannerisms, prosody, and words of the
experimenter are unknowingly mimicked
by the experimental subject as the two en-
gage on a shared task. Additionally, sub-
jects whom the experimenter mimics tend
to evaluate the experimenter more favor-
ably than if they were not mimicked (Char-
trand and Dalton, 2008). Subjects who ex-
perience social stress before beginning the
task display a higher level of unconscious
mimicry than otherwise. Casual observa-
tion of humans getting to know each other
supports the science, indicating that un-
conscious mimicry functions as ‘‘social
glue.’’ The production and detection of
mimicry requires energy, implying that the
brain cares enough to spend the resources
on a regular basis. Why? Is it possible that
humans use imitative behavior as evidence
of normal social capacities?Humans appear to be vastly more imi-
tative than other primates (Tomasello
et al., 2005). When infants begin to imi-
tate, a deeper level of bonding seems to
emerge. Why does infant imitation bring
such joy to parents? One factor among
others is that imitative performance pre-
dicts that the child has the neural where-
withal to learn what he needs to learn to
survive, both socially and in the wider
world. Negatively put, if the infant fails to
imitate, the failure is a worrisome predic-
tor that the brain lacks what the infant
needs to get on in the social world. In
the ancestral condition, parental invest-
ment may be reduced accordingly. Mim-
icry, I suggest, serves as a social signal
because it indicates the presence of a cru-
cial social capacity, namely the capacity
to ‘‘read minds’’—know what others in-
tend, believe, expect, and feel. If mimicry
can be used to evaluate infants, so also
strangers.
The idea is that adults respond posi-
tively to mimicry in social situations be-
cause imitative behavior is a powerful sig-
nal of social competence that inaugurates
trust or assures the continuation of trust. If
the newcomer is trustworthy, in this
sense, he will probably behave in a way
that is consistent with good citizenry.
This means that mimicry, even if uncon-
sciously produced and unconsciously de-
tected, is a safety signal. The level of OT,
and hence the level of trust, probably in-
crease; defensive behavior and auto-
nomic arousal decrease. Mimicry is not
a fail-safe predictor of social competence,
and full acceptance will be gradual. As
a first-pass filter, however, it may weed
out the worst. As a first-pass filter, it
may also set the stage for trade and coop-
eration with other clans.
Some strangers with evil intent may
pretend so thoroughly that they do uncon-
sciously mimic. Others may not, thus tip-
ping off the insiders that something is
amiss. The occasional sociopaths may
easily gain entry, though the old hands
may read groveling behavior as too good
to be true.
If values are rooted in biology and the
social emotions, can we just settle social/
moral questions by looking at our biology?
Can the neurobiology of social behavior
give us specific answers, such as whether
we ought to have a military draft or legalize
cocaine? No indeed, but no one seriouslyNeuron 60,supposes so anyhow. Solving social
problems is an awesomely complex busi-
ness, requiring relevant facts, including
facts about cultural practices, about
what brains do value, and fact-based
predictions about consequences. Funda-
mentally, moral/social problems are
constraint-satisfaction problems at the
many-brain level, just as most individual
choices are constraint-satisfaction prob-
lems at the single-brain level. As Aristotle
and Hume well recognized, they are prob-
lems where moral fervor or absolute rules
often get us into more trouble than calm,
collective constraint-satisfying negotia-
tion (Churchland, 2008).
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